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Abstract
We use a rule-based decision model to study social capital formation and eco-
nomic performance, where the agents are sometimes motivated by norms and some-
times by pure self-interest. In this framework, the normative concepts of trust,
cooperation and reciprocity have natural counterparts in terms of observable be-
havior, which allows us to disentangle the interaction between them and form
hypotheses that can be tested on experimental data. We apply the model to data
from experiments with a gift exchange game in Norway and the Netherlands, and
find that observed differences in trust and cooperation between the two subject
groups are accounted for by differences in reciprocity. This indicates that reci-
procity may be a key to understanding social capital formation and its effect on
economic performance.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing body of empirical evidence that differences in economic performance
across countries and regions are associated with differences in social capital. Broadly
speaking, social capital is externalities in social structures, which arise from reciprocated
trust, sanctioned norms, and efficient information networks (Coleman (1988)).1 The in-
terest in empirical research on social capital was spurred by Putnam’s (1993) comparative
study of local government in Italy.2 Subsequently, Knack and Keefer (1997), La Porta
et al. (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) have used data from the World Values Surveys3
to estimate the effect of social capital on various aspects of economic and bureaucratic
performance. All three studies show that trust has a strong and significant positive effect
on their respective performance measures. Knack and Keefer (1997) find that norms of
civic cooperation have a significant positive effect as well, and that trust and norms of
civic cooperation are positively correlated across countries.
While these studies indicate that social capital is important for growth and devel-
opment, there is only a limited amount of economic theory that can explain how. The
positive effect of trust and cooperative norms on performance is usually attributed to
the fact that it enables economic agents to transact without the need for costly formal
agreements (Arrow (1974)). As regards the relationship between trust and cooperation,
Coleman (1988), and Putnam (1993) argue that trust is based on justified expectations
of reciprocity, and this claim is supported by the positive correlation between trust and
cooperative norms found by Knack and Keefer (1997). However, the general message
from the experimental literature on e.g. bargaining games and public goods games is
that standard economic theory has low explanatory power in decision situations where
social norms are likely to be an important motivational factor besides pure self-interest.4
In this paper, we use the theory of rule-based decision making introduced by March
and Simon (1958) to construct a model of social capital formation which includes both
norms and self-interest as motivational bases for behavior. In the model, social capi-
tal emerges from the interaction between these forms of motivation, and the normative
concepts of trust, cooperation and reciprocity have natural counterparts in terms of ob-
servable behavior. To illustrate its applicability for empirical work, we estimate the model
on a set of experimental data from Norway and the Netherlands with a gift exchange
game.
1Coleman (1990) attributes the term “social capital” to Loury (1977).
2Putnam (1993) emphasizes trust, norms of civic-minded behavior and associations between groups
and horizontal networks as important forms of social capital.
3The World Values Surveys contain data on the norms and values of thousands of respondents in
some 40 countries (see e.g. Inglehart (1997)).
4See Ledyard (1995) for a survey on public goods experiments and Roth (1995) for an overview of
bargaining experiments.
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Using our model, we are able to relate differences in economic performance to differ-
ences in trust, cooperation and reciprocity, and we identify the effect of reciprocity on
the feedback relationship between trust and cooperation suggested by Coleman (1988),
Putnam (1993), and in particular, by Knack and Keefer (1997). Our main findings are
as follows: Trust induces cooperation, and there is no significant difference between the
two subject groups with regard to the nature and strength of this relationship. However,
the extent to which trust induces reciprocal behavior differs significantly between the two
subject groups. Differences in trust are accounted for by this difference in reciprocity,
and hence indirectly, reciprocity accounts for cooperation as well.
Our paper belongs to the growing literature that attempts to incorporate social norms,
like fairness, reciprocity and trust, as motivational bases for behavior. A pioneering paper
in this tradition is Rabin (1993). Based on the idea that people are willing to reward fair
intentions and to punish unfair intentions, Rabin develops a model of fairness in which
beliefs are incorporated explicitly. His approach is restricted to two-person, normal-form
games, but Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998) extend Rabin’s model in order to deal
with sequential games (like the gift exchange game of the present paper). Both Rabin
and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger focus on reciprocity.
In two other recent papers, some form of inequality aversion is the driving force of
the model. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) develop theories
of fairness, competition and cooperation, based on the premise that people are motivated
by their pecuniary payoff as well as their relative payoff standing. The main difference
between them concerns their choice of a reference point for assessing equity of outcomes.
Both models take the distribution of preferences as fixed, and the crucial assumption
is that, in addition to purely self-interested agents, there are some agents who care for
equitable outcomes.
The idea of norms and pure self-interest as joint determinants of behavior is at the
heart of our model as well, but it differs from those of Fehr and Schmidt and Bolton and
Ockenfels in some important respects. In contrast to their consequential logic of decision
making, we assume that people act according to a logic of appropriateness, where the
agents follow rules or procedures that they see as appropriate to the situation (March
(1994)). One advantage of this approach is that it accommodates Rabin’s (1993) idea that
the agents attach intentional significance to the actions of others, which may influence
the way in which they perceive the situation and hence their choice of an appropriate
action. More importantly, it allows for other norms besides fairness and inequity aversion
to play an explicit motivational role, in particular norms of trust and reciprocity. In our
model, these concepts have natural counterparts in terms of observable behavior, which
facilitates its use for empirical work on these issues.
Our paper is also related to a recent paper by Glaeser et al. (2000), which combines
data from two experiments and a survey to measure individual and situational correlates
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of trust and trustworthiness. They argue that attitudinal trust surveys at best weakly
predict trust behavior but are much better in predicting trustworthy behavior. Trusting
behavior in the experiments is correlated with past trusting behavior outside the experi-
ments. Their experimental results from a trust game and our results from a gift exchange
game are consistent and suggest that trustworthiness/reciprocity is an important ingre-
dient of social capital.5 However, the present paper goes one step further by developing
some theory for social capital formation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present
our model of rule-based decision making, and in section 3, we introduce the gift exchange
game and the experimental procedure. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 contains
the econometric results, and section 6 concludes.
2 A model of rule-based decision making
In a trust-sensitive transaction between two parties, the benefits to one of them depends
in general on some future action by the other. Most business transactions are sensitive to
trust, even when some aspects of the transaction are regulated by formal contracts that
can be enforced in a court of law. In this paper we follow the interpretation Berg et al.
(1995) gave to Coleman’s (1990) definition of trust. Subjects have used trust to facilitate
exchange if the following conditions are met: 1) Placing trust in the trustee puts the
trustor at risk; 2) Related to the set of possible actions, the trustee’s decision benefits
the trustor at a cost to the trustee; and 3) both trustor and trustee are made better off
from the transaction compared to the outcome which would have occurred if the trustor
had not entrusted the trustee. As we will see, all these conditions are applicable to the
situations we are considering here.
In this section, we develop a simple model of behavior in trust-sensitive decision situ-
ations. In this model, social capital is simply reciprocated trust. Our point of departure
is the theory of rule-based decision making introduced by March and Simon (1958). It
rests on a “logic of appropriateness”, which involves classifying the decision situation,
identifying one’s role in that situation, and choosing an action which is appropriate for
someone who plays that role in the given situation (March (1994), March and Olsen
(1989)). The decision process is seen as complex, due to ambiguous roles and situations,
and therefore outcomes are non-deterministic at the individual level. The usefulness of
5This conclusion is strong, given the fact that the experiments differ in several ways, the most
important difference probably being that subjects in the trust game know the other subject in the pair
(and they may even be close friends) while in our experiment subjects do not know with whom they are
paired. Secondly, the trust game is played only once, while our experiment consists of 15 repetitions of
a one-shot game (although it is not a truly one-shot game, subjects do not know against whom they are
playing so it is impossible to build (individual) reputation).
3
that framework for our purpose, is that it allows decision makers to be driven by conflict-
ing motives, and this permits us to study the interaction of norms and pure self-interest
which seems to be a key to understanding trust and cooperation.
Formally, we consider situations where two agents, 1 and 2, choose non-negative effort
levels e1 and e2 in periods 1 and 2, and obtain symmetric payoffs u
1(e1, e2) and u
2(e2, e1),
respectively. As we will only consider situations where the payoff functions are symmetric,
we will henceforth drop the superscript and refer to the payoff functions of agents 1 and
2 as u(e1, e2) and u(e2, e1), respectively. Let uk denote the derivative of u with respect
to its k’th argument. We assume that effort is individually costly, and that some effort
is collectively beneficial, in the sense that u1(ei, ej) < 0 and u1(0, 0) + u2(0, 0) > 0.
Note that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is for both agents to supply zero
effort. However, we assume here that agents are sometimes motivated by social norms and
sometimes by pure self-interest, according to some random mechanism that is not a result
of conscious deliberation, but that may depend on the details of the choice situation at
hand. More precisely, we consider two alternative decision modes, one cooperative (mode
C), and one opportunistic (mode O), and for each agent i a random mode selection
mechanism, represented as a probability distribution pi on the set of modes {C,O}.
In decision mode O, the agent interprets the situation as a strategic game against
an opponent who is likely to pursue his interests at her cost. She therefore feels free to
exploit her own profit opportunities, and chooses an action which maximizes her expected
utility. In decision mode C, she interprets the situation as one that calls for collective
action, identifies her own interests with those of her transaction partner, and chooses an
action based on her ideas about fair division and proper conduct in such situations.6
Let pi and 1−pi denote the probabilities of selecting mode C and O, respectively, for
agents i = 1, 2. As regards p1, it may depend on agent 1’s experience with similar decision
situations in the past, and possibly on his beliefs about how agent 2 will interpret the
situation. However, it cannot depend on the actual behavior of agent 2, and therefore
p1 is a predetermined variable in any given decision situation. As regards p2, however,
we shall allow for the possibility that it depends on the amount of effort supplied by
agent 1, in order to accommodate Rabin’s (1993) idea that the agents are sensitive to
perceived intentions of others: A high effort by player 1 may reasonably be interpreted
by player 2 as an invitation to cooperate and share the potential benefits of the game,
while a low effort is a signal that player 1 does not expect player 2 to cooperate. Thus,
e1 is a behavioral measure of the trustfulness of agent 1, as seen from the point of view
6Williamson (1993) makes a distinction between calculative trust and personal trust. Calculative
trust occurs when the trustor decides whether or not to entrust the trustee on the basis of an expected
utility calculation. Personal trust is based on more of a noncalculative “feeling” that entrusting the
trustee is the correct decision. These definitions come rather close to our concepts of being in the
opportunistic or the cooperative mode, respectively.
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of agent 2, while p2 measures the trustworthiness of agent 2. In what follows, we adapt
the hypothesis of Knack and Keefer (1997) that trust induces cooperation, i.e. that
p′2(e1) > 0.
Consider agent 2’s decision problem under the two alternative decision modes. In the
opportunistic mode, she maximizes expected utility by setting e2 = 0, since u1(e2, e1) < 0,
while in the cooperative mode, she chooses an effort level e2(e1), which, as indicated, may
also depend on e1. If e
′
2(·) > 0, we say that agent 2 behaves reciprocally, i.e. by supplying
more effort in response to more effort by agent 1.7 In what follows, we will assume that
this is the case.
Consider next agent 1’s decision problem. If 1 is in the cooperative mode, he chooses
an appropriate action which we denote by eC1 . As is the case with p1, it may depend
on 1’s beliefs and experience, but it is a predetermined variable in any given decision
situation. If agent 1 is in the opportunistic mode, he maximizes expected utility, which
is given by
p2(e1)u(e1, e2(e1)) + (1− p2(e1))u(e1, 0).
Let eO1 (p2(·), e2(·)) denote the optimal effort by agent 1 in the opportunistic mode.
As indicated, it will depend on the functions p2(·) and e2(·), which describe agent 1’s
expectations about 2’s behavior. The first-order condition for an optimum yields some
insight into the nature of these dependencies. It is given by
0 = p′2(e1)(u(e1, e2(e1))− u(e1, 0))
+ p2(e1)u2(e1, e2(e1))e
′
2(e1) (1)
+ p2(e1)u1(e1, e2(e1)) + (1− p2(e1))u1(e1, 0),
and has the following interpretation: The first term is the effect of 1’s trust on 2’s trust-
worthiness, multiplied by the gain in 1’s utility if agent 2 switches from the opportunistic
to the cooperative mode. The second term is the expected increase in the reciprocal
effort by agent 2 in response to increased effort by agent 1, and the third term is agent
1’s expected marginal cost of effort.
The main point to notice is that an increase in the trustworthiness or reciprocity of
agent 2 increases the optimal amount of effort supplied by agent 1 under the opportunis-
tic decision mode. This in turn increases the trustworthiness of agent 2, and induces
increased reciprocal efforts by cooperative second players. Thus, the model captures the
two-way causality between trust and cooperation suggested by Knack and Keefer (1997),
and indicates that reciprocity plays an important part in it.
7We follow the narrow defintion of recipocity, in the sense that we assume that reciprocity refers to
a conditional obligation: Good behavior is rewarded and bad behavior is punished (Gouldner (1960)).
See also footnote 18.
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Note that by this model, the normative concepts of trust, reciprocity, and cooperation
are translated into behavioral counterparts, which enables one to analyze the implications
for actual behavior. These behavioral implications are summarized in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Agent behavior in the rule-based decision model
Mode Agent 1 Agent 2
C eC1 e2(e1)
O eO1 (p2(·), e2(·)) 0
Pr(C) p1 p2(e1)
3 The gift exchange game
The gift exchange game (see also Van der Heijden et al. (1998a)) is a special case of a
trust-sensitive decision situation as described in the previous section. In this game, the
payoff-function u is given by
u(ei, ej) = (9− ei)(ej + 1)k, (2)
where ei is an integer between 0 and 7 inclusive, which represents a transfer (effort) from
player i to player j.
The gift exchange game can be given the following interpretation: Each of the two
players has a high endowment (of 9) in one period and a low endowment (of 1) in the
other period. In the first period, player 1 has a high endowment and he decides on his gift
e1 to player 2, who has a low endowment. In the second period the roles are reversed;
player 2 has a high endowment, player 1 has a low endowment, and player 2 decides
on her (return) gift e2 to player 1. In the basic treatment, also called the information
treatment, player 2 is informed about the size of the gift e1 before she has to decide
on e2.
8 Endowments and gifts together determine players’ final asset levels in the two
periods. If player i gives a gift of ei when he has an endowment of 9, then his final assets
in that period are 9− ei. If player i receives a gift of ej when he has an endowment of 1,
then player i’s final assets in that period are 1 + ej. The payoffs to player i are defined
as the product of the final assets levels in the two periods, as shown in (2), where k is a
constant used to transform the payoffs in points to monetary earnings.
Note that in the gift exchange game the payoff to both players is 9 when no gifts
(efforts) are made, while the maximal symmetric payoff is 25, which is obtained when all
8We have also performed a control treatment in which player 2 is not informed about the size of the
gift made by player 1. For the moment, we focus on the basic treatment but we will briefly discuss the
results of the control treatment in section 5.
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players give 4. However, it is possible to achieve higher expected payoffs. If the players
somehow managed to transfer 0 as player 1 and 7 as player 2, or vice versa, they would
get an expected payoff of 37 under random assignment of players to positions: 72 in the
position in which one expects to give 0 and to get 7, and 2 in the opposite position.
3.1 The experimental procedure
Five sessions of the basic version of the gift exchange game were run in Tilburg, the
Netherlands and six sessions were run in Bergen, Norway. The procedure of the experi-
ment was identical in both countries. All sessions were run with eight participants except
for one session in Norway, which was run with six participants.9 A session typically lasted
for about an hour.
The Norwegian participants were undergraduate and graduate students from the Nor-
wegian School of Economics and Business Administration in Bergen, who all studied
(business) economics. They were mainly recruited by posters and in classrooms, ask-
ing for participants for a decision-making experiment, and promising monetary rewards
contingent on performance. The Dutch participants were undergraduate and graduate
students from Tilburg University. These students came from various disciplines like law
and psychology, but the majority studied economics.10 Dutch subjects were mainly re-
cruited by an announcement in the University Bulletin and by posters. None of the
participants had previous experience from any related experiment and none of them par-
ticipated more than once. In both countries, people showing up together when signing up
for the experiment were allocated to different sessions. Subjects did not get to know any-
thing more specific about what type of game they would be playing before the experiment
started.
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly seated behind computer terminals, which were
separated by partitions. Instructions in the subjects’ own language were distributed and
read aloud by the experimenter.11 After that, subjects got several minutes to study the
instructions more carefully and to ask questions.
After one practice round, the subjects played 15 repetitions of the gift exchange
game. In each round, subjects were randomly and anonymously paired into four couples,
and also randomly assigned to have a high endowment in either the first or the second
period. For each couple, player 1 made a transfer (e1) to player 2, after which player
2 was informed about e1. Then the two players switched roles, and player 2 made a
9The fact that one session had only 6 participants was not planned but occurred because of no shows.
Since the results of that session are not substantially different from those of other sessions within the
same treatment, we pool the data from this session with the data from the other sessions.
10We have not found any significant difference in behavior between economics students and other
students in the Netherlands.
11An English translation of the instructions is included as appendix to this paper.
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transfer (e2) to player 1. Earnings of player i in each round (ui) were denoted in points
and calculated according to equation (2). Subjects could also use a table included in the
instructions, which gave ui as a function of ei and ej (see appendix). Subjects knew that
a total of 15 rounds would be played and that after the last round the points earned in
all rounds would be accumulated and transferred into money earnings at a fixed known
rate.
After 15 rounds, subjects were privately paid their earnings in cash and left. Each
point in the experiment in Norway and the Netherlands earned 20 øre and 5 cents, respec-
tively. In addition, Norwegian participants received 20 Norwegian Kroner for showing up
in time and the Dutch ones 5 Dutch Guilders.12 From the remarks subjects could make
on a sheet during the experiment and from discussions we had with subjects afterwards,
we infer that they understood the game very well. They were typically more concerned
with how to play the game rather than with its interpretation.
It is important to note that in every round a new random and anonymous assignment
of the players to the couples took place, i.e. that a subject was not matched with the
same subject for all rounds. Furthermore, in each round it was randomly determined who
was first to decide on a gift. By this procedure, the 15 repetitions are almost one-shot
games and the scope for individual reputation building is minimized.13
In cross-cultural experimental studies one should in general be aware of three poten-
tial risks: experimenter effects, currency effects and language effects (Roth et al. (1991)).
In our experiment we have tried to minimize these effects by taking the following pre-
cautions. One of the experimenters was present during the experimental sessions in both
countries. Existing exchange rates were used to transform the payoff schedules. Finally,
the instructions were translated from Dutch to Norwegian by one of the experimenters
who is familiar with both languages. After that, they were compared with an English
translation by another person who speaks all three languages.
4 The data
In this section, we summarize the main features of our experimental data. Table 2
presents for both countries separately, a detailed overview of the gifts e1 and e2 exchanged
by all matched pairs of first and second players, respectively, over the 15 rounds of
all relevant sessions of the gift exchange experiment, along with means and standard
deviations.
12At the time of the experiment, one Norwegian Krone exchanged for about 0.27 Dutch Guilders, and
one Dutch Guilder was about $0.50. The potential earnings in both countries were similar in relative
terms. Expected earnings, based on previous experience of the experimenters, were somewhat higher
than what students could earn with one hour of work in, for instance, a bar.
13See Kreps and Wilson (1982) for reputational effects in repeated games.
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Table 2: Gifts by matched pairs of players
Netherlands
e1 \ e2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
0 78 0 2 1 3 0 0 7 91
1 19 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 24
2 35 7 3 0 1 0 0 0 46
3 42 3 7 14 0 0 0 1 67
4 40 7 4 4 6 0 0 0 61
5 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Total 223 22 17 19 10 0 0 9 300
e¯1 = 2.10, se1 = 1.74, e¯2 = 0.72, se2 = 1.54
Norway
e1 \ e2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
0 54 1 0 0 1 0 0 5 61
1 15 5 0 1 0 0 1 0 22
2 26 0 8 2 0 0 0 0 36
3 48 7 10 15 3 0 1 0 84
4 74 3 6 13 28 0 0 0 124
5 6 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 12
6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
7 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 5
Total 227 16 25 31 37 1 2 6 345
e¯1 = 2.73, se1 = 1.63, e¯2 = 1.06, se2 = 1.70
A first observation from the table is that average gifts are positive, which contrasts
the game-theoretic prediction of zero transfers. Second, the average gifts by both first
and second players are significantly higher in Norway than in the Netherlands: A non-
parametric Mann-Whitney U test with session averages as units of observation reveals
that for first and second players the hypothesis that average gifts are equal across coun-
tries can be rejected at the 10-percent level (see also section 5, in particular Table 8).
Third, the average value of e1 is much higher than the average value of e2; in both coun-
tries this difference is significant at the 5-percent level (using a non-parametric Wilcoxon
test with session averages as units of observation). Notice, moreover, that all gifts range
from 0 to 7, but that only for Norwegian first players a positive gift occurs most fre-
quently: the mode of e1 is 4 in Norway.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here]
If one considers the development of gifts over time, it turns out that gifts decline over
rounds, but that last round gifts are still positive (see Figures 1 and 2 for the average gift
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by round for the Netherlands and Norway, respectively). More importantly, it appears
that the large differences between e1 and e2, as suggested by Table 2, are persistent over
time: In all rounds, the average value of e1 is about 2.5 - 3 times as high as the average
value of e2 in both Norway and the Netherlands.
Consider again the frequency distributions of gifts by first and second players in Table
2. The table shows that the percentage of zero gifts by player 2 is in the neighborhood
of 70 percent for both countries, and somewhat higher for the Netherlands than for
Norway. Thus, on average across both countries, some 70 percent of second players act in
agreement with individual rationality, while the remaining 30 percent display cooperative
behavior by giving positive amounts. Turning next to the distribution of gifts by first
players, we see that the percentage of zero transfers is much lower in Norway than in the
Netherlands (18 and 30 percent, respectively). Examining the positive transfers made
by players 1 and 2 a bit closer, it turns out that in Norway, higher positive transfers (3,
4) occur more frequently than lower ones (1, 2) for both players, at least for transfers in
the interval [1,4], whereas in the Netherlands, this only holds for first players, but not
for second players.
In sum, we see that the Norwegian subjects exchange larger gifts and hence reap
greater benefits than their Dutch counterparts, and that these differences in behavior
and performance are persistent across all rounds of the game.
One puzzling feature of the data, which can be seen from Table 2, is that the largest
gifts by player 2 come in response to zero gifts by player 1. For both subject groups,
the median gift is the largest possible one of 7 for those second players who transfer
positive amounts in response to zero gifts by first players. We believe that this apparent
anomaly is due to an attempt by some subjects to signal their interest in establishing
one of the asymmetric socially optimal strategies, which were shown in section 3 to yield
the maximal expected payoff in the gift exchange game, for one of these strategies is to
give 7 as player 2 in response to a zero gift by player 1.
This type of social maximizing behavior is clearly quite different from the cooperative
behavior mode of our rule-based decision model, and so the question is how to deal with
it. Given the nature of the rule-based decision model, one natural alternative would
be to include it as a third behavior mode, and estimate submodels for it along with
the submodels for the other two behavior modes. For player 2, this is clearly a feasible
alternative, since the social maximizing behavior mode is easily distinguishable from the
other modes by its return gift of 7 in response to zero. For player 1, one would need
information about expected return gifts in order to distinguish between social maximizers,
who make zero gifts because they expect high gifts in return from other social maximizers,
and players in the opportunistic mode, who make zero gifts because they expect nothing
in return from anybody. Our data set does include information about first players’
expectations, and in 16 out of all 645 cases, player 1 makes a zero gift and expects to
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get 7 in return. As can be seen from Table 2, the corresponding number of observations
with social maximizing second players is 12 (5 in Norway (all different subjects) and 7 in
the Netherlands (1 subject does it in 4 rounds, and 3 other subjects)). In any case, the
number of observations where some player is in the social maximizing mode is so small
that it makes little sense to add submodels for that behavior mode. Instead, we will
exclude those observations where player 2 gives 7 in response to zero when we estimate
the reciprocity part of the model, and those observations where player 1 expects 7 in
response to zero when we investigate the behavior of player 1.
5 Estimation of the rule-based decision model
In this section, we estimate the rule-based decision model described in section 2 on the
set of cross-country experimental data from the gift exchange game. Recall that by this
model, the decision making process is a two-stage procedure: In stage 1 the player’s
decision mode is determined by a draw from a probability distribution p on the two
decision modes C (cooperative) and O (opportunistic), and in stage 2, the agent chooses
a non-negative effort level e (i.e. transfers an amount e to the other player), conditional
on the mode selected in stage 1.
We begin by considering the behavior of second players, as described by the mode
selection mechanism and the reciprocity model: In subsection 5.1, we estimate the prob-
ability that subjects are in the cooperative mode (the function p2(e1)) while in subsection
5.2 we estimate the reciprocity model (the function e2(e1)). We estimate these functions
for the Dutch and Norwegian subgroups separately, to uncover possible differences in
trustworthiness and reciprocity between them. Subsection 5.2 also presents some results
from a control treatment with the gift exchange game as a validity check on our findings.
In subsection 5.3, we first present some empirical results on the behavior of first players.
We then compare differences between the Dutch and Norwegian subject groups in terms
of joint behavior of first and second players to check the overall consistency between our
empirical results and the theoretical model.
5.1 Estimation of the mode selection mechanism for player 2
In order to determine the probability that subjects are in the cooperative mode (given
by p2(e1)), and to identify possible differences in trustworthiness between the two groups
of subjects, we introduce the binary variable C (for cooperative mode), which is 1 if e2 is
positive, and zero if no effort is made, i.e. if e2 = 0 (see also Table 1). Thus, the variable
Ci (for agent i) is defined as
Ci =
{
1 if e2i > 0
0 if e2i = 0
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with e2i the effort made by player i when acting as a second player. We then estimate
the probability that Ci = 1 by the following standard logit model
P (Ci = 1|xi) = P (y∗i > 0|xi) = P (x′iβ + i > 0|xi) = P (i > −x′iβ|xi) = (1 + e−x
′
iβ)−1
where y∗i = x
′
iβ + i, and i follows a logistic distribution. We use the data set consisting
of all Dutch and Norwegian player pairs. As potential explanatory variables x we take all
linear and quadratic terms in e1 (transfer by player 1) and r (round number), i.e. e1, r,
e1r = e1× r, e1sq = e1× e1, and rsq = r× r. By using a forward selection procedure and
a 5 percent minimum significance level, the model appears to consist of the 3 explanatory
variables e1, e1r and e1sq. To allow for individual-specific effects, we have also estimated
a fixed effect logit model.14 The results of both models are shown in Table 3. As can be
seen from the table, allowing for individual-specific effects has no significant impact on
the results.
Table 3: Estimated trustworthiness. Pooled data
standard logit fixed effects logit
variable coeff. p-value coeff. p-value
e1 1.072 0.000 1.024 0.000
e1sq -0.108 0.000 -0.095 0.010
e1r -0.039 0.000 -0.045 0.000
constant -1.877 0.000 na. na.
log-likelihood -361.04 -158.05
By taking the derivative of P (Ci = 1|xi) with respect to e1 and r, using the estimates
of Table 4, we can derive how the probability of being in the cooperative mode is related
to changes in the transfer of player 1 and the number of the round, respectively. It turns
out that for the large majority of the observed values of e1 and r (79% of all observations),
the probability of triggering the cooperative mode of player 2 is an increasing function
of e1, but that the effect of round number is always negative. Thus, in particular, it
becomes more difficult for player 1 to trigger a cooperative response by player 2 as the
game approaches the final round.
In order to see if there are any systematic differences between the trustworthiness of
the two groups of subjects, we introduce a dummy hol for the Netherlands (Holland),
14See, e.g. Baltagi (1995) for a general introduction to panel data techniques and Chamberlain (1980)
for estimation methods for fixed effects logit models. The fixed effects logit model (or conditional logit
model) is obtained if we assume that the error term i is given by i = µi+νit, where the µi are assumed
to be unknown fixed individual-specific parameters and the remainder disturbances νit are iid (0, σ2v),
independent of each other and of xit. We have also performed a random effects logit regression, but the
results are very similar to the other specifications (available upon request).
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and the variables he1 = e1 × hol, he1sq = e1sq × hol and he1r = e1r × hol. We then
re-estimate the model and obtain the results depicted in Table 4.
Table 4: Test of country-specific differences in trustworthiness
standard logit fixed effects logit
variable coeff. p-value coeff. p-value
e1 1.062 0.000 1.135 0.000
e1sq -0.094 0.027 -0.109 0.019
e1r -0.043 0.000 -0.057 0.000
he1 -0.013 0.970 -0.356 0.421
he1sq -0.034 0.603 0.052 0.516
he1r 0.011 0.481 0.031 0.121
hol -0.071 0.872 na. na.
constant -1.827 0.000 na. na.
log-likelihood -359.54 -156.45
As can be seen from Table 4, none of the country-specific variables are individually
significant. Moreover, a joint likelihood ratio test of these variables reveals no significant
difference between the two data sets as regards cooperative behavior. This implies that
Dutch and Norwegian subjects display the same degree of trustworthiness and that the
probability of being in the cooperative mode, as affected by stimuli in terms of varying
transfers, is also the same. Given the differences in gift behavior between the two groups
of subjects, as mentioned in the previous section, this suggests that the observed differ-
ences must be related to differences in trust and reciprocity among cooperating subjects,
and not to differences in the probabilities of choosing the cooperative mode.
5.2 Estimation of the reciprocity model for player 2
To see if differences in trust and reciprocity among cooperative subjects can explain the
observed differences, we consider for each country the set of second players who display
cooperative behavior by transferring a positive amount to player 1.15 We estimate the
reciprocity function e2(e1) both by means of a simple OLS regression of e2 on e1, as well
as a fixed effect regression. The results for the Netherlands and Norway are depicted in
Tables 5 and 6, respectively.
The table shows that the reciprocity coefficient in the Netherlands is not significantly
different from zero (p > 0.49), while in Norway it is significant and close to 1/2 (p <
15As mentioned earlier, we exclude 12 observations where player 2 gives 7 in response to a zero gift
by player 1, which indicates that player 2 is in the social maximizing mode discussed in section 4.
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Table 5: Estimated reciprocity model for the Netherlands
OLS fixed effects
variable coeff. p-value coeff. p-value
e1 -0.086 0.495 0.015 0.886
constant 2.627 0.000 2.343 0.000
R2 0.0 na.
Table 6: Estimated reciprocity model for Norway
OLS fixed effects
variable coeff. p-value coeff. p-value
e1 0.472 0.000 0.584 0.000
constant 1.345 0.000 0.971 0.002
R2 0.20 na.
0.001). Again, the size of the estimated coefficients and the p-values are robust across
the chosen specifications.16 It implies that there are two incentives for Norwegian players
1 to make positive gifts to player 2: First it increases the probability of triggering the
cooperative mode of player 2, and second, it increases the transfer by player 2, given that
player 2 is in the cooperative mode. In the Netherlands, however, only the first effect is
present, and this explains the relatively low transfers by first players in the Netherlands
as a rational response by opportunistic first players to the absence of reciprocity, and
the low transfers by second players as the result of low gifts by first players triggering
few cooperative second players. It appears that trust induces cooperation, and this
relationship is as strong in the Netherlands as in Norway. However, the degree to which
trust induces reciprocity proves to be much higher in Norway.17
Additional evidence for this conclusion can be derived from the control treatment.
Recall that the only difference between the basic treatment and the control treatment
is that in the former treatment, player 2 is informed about e1 before she has to decide
on e2 whereas she is not informed about this in the latter treatment (see footnote 8).
Consequently, in the control treatment, players can display trust and cooperation, but
16The results still hold if we control for potential dynamic effects by including round number, gifts
received and made in the previous round, and player position in the previous round as additional ex-
planatory variables.
17In an overlapping generations variant of the gift exchange experiment, only run in the Netherlands,
Van der Heijden et al. (1998b) also find hardly any signs of reciprocity among Dutch subjects.
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not reciprocity.18 Table 7 lists average gifts by country and by player, averaged over
all 15 rounds and 5 sessions that were run with the control treatment in each country,
with standard deviations in parentheses. For the sake of comparison, Table 8 presents
the corresponding results of the basic treatment. The bottom rows of the tables show
whether the gifts by players 1 and 2 are different in a particular treatment (using a
non-parametric Wilcoxon test with session averages as units of observation). The last
columns show the results of a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test to see whether the
average values of e1 and e2 differ across countries.
Table 7: Average gifts by player and country for the control treatment
Netherlands Norway significance
e1 0.99 (1.50) 1.43 (1.92) p=0.35
e2 1.03 (1.47) 1.21 (1.80) p=0.83
significance p=0.35 p=0.69
Table 8: Average gifts by player and country for the basic treatment
Netherlands Norway significance
e1 2.10 (1.74) 2.73 (1.63) p=0.07
e2 0.72 (1.54) 1.06 (1.70) p=0.10
significance p=0.03 p=0.05
As can be seen from Table 7, the average gifts by players 1 and 2 are not significantly
different in the control treatment. This contrasts with the results of the basic treatment
shown in Table 8, where these differences are significant at the 5% level. Furthermore,
whereas the Norwegian and Dutch subjects behave quite differently in the basic treat-
ment, these differences do not show up in the control treatment. In fact, the frequency
distributions of e1 and e2 (not shown here) hardly differ across countries. In particular,
the percentage of zero gifts is 55.8% for the Netherlands and 56% for Norway in the
control treatment.
The results from the control treatment thus lend additional support to our claim
that the two groups of subjects are similar on the dimensions of trustworthiness and
18That is, the experimental design is such that reciprocal acts, in the sense of reacting to observed
behavior (as in the definition of Gouldner (1960)), are only possible in the basic treatment. A much
weaker form of reciprocity, namely reciprocating anticipated gifts (as in the reciprocity definition of
Sugden (1984)), is possible in both treatments. The literature on social capital (Coleman (1988), Putnam
(1993), and Knack and Keefer (1997)) emphasizes, however, the conditional element of reciprocity, and
this strong form of reciprocity is precluded in our control treatment.
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cooperation, and that the difference in aggregate performance between the two groups is
due to differences in reciprocal behavior.
The average payoffs of the subjects illustrate this: recall that the Nash equilibrium
payoff is 9, while the average payoffs are 18.7 and 20.7 for Dutch and Norwegian subjects,
respectively. Thus the difference in reciprocated trust between the two countries results
in an increase in the value of social capital of approximately 20%.
5.3 Some empirical results for player 1
We conclude this section by presenting some results on the behavior of first players in our
experiment. Ideally, we would like to proceed in the same manner as for second players,
and distinguish between opportunistic and cooperative players to see if there are any
systematic differences between the two behavior modes. However, the data do not allow
us to distinguish sharply between the behavior modes of first players. In particular, a
positive gift by player 1 does not necessarily mean that he is in the cooperative behavior
mode, because opportunistic first players may also find it in their interest to make positive
gifts in order to trigger the cooperative behavior mode of player 2. We suggest to deal with
this problem by considering only those first players who played second in the previous
period, and using their behavior mode in that period as a proxy for their behavior mode
in the current period. To that end, we introduce a dummy variable NICE, which is 1 if
the player made a positive gift in the previous round, and zero otherwise.19
Table 9: Average gifts by first players who played second in the previous round
NICE Netherlands Norway significance
0 1.92 (1.72) 2.49 (1.61) p=0.07
1 2.84 (1.27) 3.52 (1.10) p=0.09
significance p=0.07 p=0.02
Table 9 shows the average gifts for the first players who played second in the previous
round, conditional on the dummy variable NICE and country, along with standard devi-
ations.20 We also present significance levels of a Wilcoxon test and a Mann-Whitney U
test of equality between rows and columns, respectively, using session averages as units
of observation.
19The implication of this definition is that returning zero in response to a zero gift in the previous
round is classified as non-NICE behavior, which may be questionable. Dropping those observations does
not yield any significant changes in the results, however.
20We exclude 16 observations where player 1 makes a zero gift and expects to get 7 in return, which
indicates that player 1 is in the social maximizing mode.
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The table shows that NICE first players make significantly higher gifts than the
non-NICE ones, especially in the Norwegian subject group. In other words, cooperative
first players are more inclined to trust their partners, as compared to opportunistic ones,
which suggests that social norms are a stronger motivational basis for trust than pure self-
interest. The table also shows that the Norwegian first players make higher gifts than the
Dutch ones, no matter whether they played NICE or not in the previous round.21 In view
of our main result on the differences in reciprocity between the Dutch and Norwegian
subject groups, this suggests that trust is vulnerable to lack of reciprocity, not only
among those subjects who act according to pure self-interest, but also among those who
are mainly motivated by social norms. Although the psychological mechanisms that link
trust and reciprocity may be different in the two decision modes, the result is the same:
Reciprocity induces trust, which in turn induces reciprocity.
6 Conclusion
Trust, cooperation and reciprocity have been identified as important elements of social
capital formation in several earlier empirical and experimental studies. In particular,
Knack and Keefer (1997) suggest that there exists a positive feedback relationship be-
tween trust and trustworthiness, whose strength is in part determined by the degree of
reciprocity present in society. With aggregate data it is difficult to disentangle the ef-
fects and interactions of these variables in the formation of social capital. The present
paper contributes to this literature by constructing and estimating a decision model that
combines norms and individual rationality, which allows one to examine the relationship
between trust, cooperation and reciprocity.
Our model is an instance of the theory of rule-based decision making introduced by
March and Simon (1958). The theory of rule following rests on a “logic of appropriate-
ness”, which involves classifying the situation, identifying one’s role in that situation,
and choosing an action which is appropriate for someone who plays that role in the given
situation (see also March (1994) and March and Olsen (1989)). In our model, individual
behavior is sometimes motivated by norms on trust and cooperation, and sometimes by
pure self-interest, according to a random mechanism that is not the outcome of conscious
deliberation, but that may depend on the specific characteristics of the choice situation in
which the individual finds herself. In the model, social capital emerges from the interac-
tion between these forms of motivation, and the normative concepts of trust, cooperation
and reciprocity have natural counterparts in terms of observable behavior.
21One could argue that the decision to make a positive gift as a first player is not related to the mode
a player is in, but is (purely) driven by the expectation that other players cooperate (in response to a
positive gift). It turns out, however, that the expected return gifts do not differ significantly between
Norwegian and Dutch subjects who played NICE in the previous round.
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Our model is different from other models that have recently appeared in the litera-
ture. We suppose that people do not behave according to a logic of consequences (where
decisions are made on the basis of intendedly rational calculation) but according to a
logic of appropriateness (based on rule following). Recently, Messick (1999) has argued
that the theory of rule-based decision making may be more adequate than traditional
consequentialist models (like e.g. Rabin (1993), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Fehr and
Schmidt (1999), and Levine (1998)) to account for human decision making in some cir-
cumstances, stressing the need for “a theory to improve our understanding of how social
situations are perceived and what the role of personal and environmental factors are in
this process” (p. 27). The present paper may be seen as a first attempt to meet this
need. We believe that our model can be applied to other experimental situations, where
interaction between norms and individual rationality is likely to be of some importance.
Examples are the trust game of Berg et al. (1995), and experimental labor market situ-
ations as studied by Fehr and others (e.g. Fehr et al. (1993, 1997, 1998), Kirchler et al.
(1996)). In such experiments, the typical finding is that subjects behave cooperatively
to some degree, but it is often difficult to explain why they do so, and, in particular,
whether they are motivated by trust, reciprocity or some other social norm. Whereas
most models are only suited to explain behavior in the long run (equilibrium behavior),
our model can be used for the short run as well.
We have applied our rule-based decision model to a set of experimental data from
a gift exchange game for Norway and the Netherlands. At first sight, a cross-cultural
experimental study between Norway and the Netherlands may not look so interesting
as the two countries seem to be very similar on most dimensions (like location, type of
welfare state etc).22 In spite of that, data from surveys like the World Value Surveys
suggest that the countries differ in ways that agree with our findings. We find that the
Norwegian subject group performs better in our experiment than the subject group from
the Netherlands. In addition, we find that trust induces cooperation, and that there is
no significant difference between subjects in the Netherlands and Norway with regard to
the nature and strength of this relationship. However, the extent to which trust induces
reciprocal behavior differs significantly between the two subject groups. Differences in
trust are accounted for by this difference in reciprocity, and hence indirectly, reciprocity
accounts for cooperation as well. We believe that the fact that such sharp conclusions
can be drawn from data from two countries that look similar, gives us a stronger case
than if we had found differences between say Norway and Indonesia.
22See also e.g. Hofstede (1980) for differences in cultural dimensions.
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Appendix
This appendix gives the English translation of the (Dutch) instructions of the gift ex-
change experiment. The text between square brackets ([ ]) was added in the basic (in-
formation) treatment. The text between brackets ({ }) was added when more than 8
participants showed up.
Introduction (read aloud only)
You are about to participate in an experimental study of decision-making. The experi-
ment will last for about one hour. The instructions of the experiment are simple and if
you follow them carefully and make good decisions you may earn a considerable amount
of money. All the money you earn will be yours to keep and will be paid to you, privately
and confidentially, in cash right after the end of the experiment
{For the experiment it is of crucial importance to have 8 participants. However,
experience learns that often 1 or 2 persons do not show up or do not show up in time.
Therefore, we need to have 10 instead of 8 subscriptions. This sometimes has, as now,
the consequence that too many participants are present and that 1 or 2 persons cannot
participate in this experiment. These persons can still put their name down for one of
the following experiments and receive Dfl 10 for any inconvenience. These persons are
determined by lot because one or two blank envelopes are added to the box with seating
numbers, unless one of you checks in voluntarily not to participate in the experiment and
receive Dfl 10 instead.}
Before we go on with the instructions, I would like to ask all of you to draw an
envelope from this box and open it. The number denotes the terminal you have to be
seated. {If you draw a blank envelope you cannot participate in the experiment and you
receive Dfl 10.}
We will distribute the instructions of the experiment now and read through them
together. After that, you will have the opportunity to ask questions. From now on, you
are requested not to talk to, or communicate with, any other participant.
Instructions (distributed and read aloud)
Decisions and earnings
The experiment exists of fifteen separate rounds. In every round, each of you will earn
a certain amount of points. At the end of the experiment the points earned in the 15
rounds are added up for each participant separately. Every point earned is worth 5 cent
(≈$0.028) at the end of the experiment. In addition to this, all participants receive a
fixed extra amount of Dfl 5. Your total earnings will thus be equal to Dfl 5 plus the
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number of points earned times 5 cent. Now, we describe how the points earned in each
round will be determined.
In each round you will be matched with another participant. Each round will consist
of two periods. In every round you have in one period the role of Decider and in the other
period the role of Receiver. The earnings of a participant in a round are determined by
the final assets of a participant in the period in which he or she is a Decider, and by the
final assets of the participant in the period in which he or she is a Receiver. We denote
the final assets as Receiver by EO and the final assets as Decider by EB. The earnings
in points of a participant in a round are determined by the product of the final assets
as Receiver and the final assets as Decider. The earnings of a participant in a round are
thus equal to EB × EO points. Next, we describe how the final assets as Decider EB
and the final assets as Receiver EO are determined.
In each round the participants are first randomly matched two by two. After that
the computer determines for each couple who will be the Decider in the first period and
who will be the Decider in the second period. In the second period the roles are reversed:
the Decider in the first period is thus the Receiver in the second period and the Receiver
in the first period is the Decider in of the second period. The Receiver starts with an
endowment of 1, whereas the Decider starts with and endowment of 9. The Decider has
to decide which part of his or her endowment he or she wants to transfer to the Receiver.
This transfer, which we will denote by T, is 0 at the minimum, and 7 at the maximum.
After the Decider has decided about the transfer T to the Receiver, the final assets of
the Receiver are EO=1+T, and those of the Decider are EB=9-T. After the Decider has
decided about her or his transfer to the Receiver, the second period of the round will be
started, in which the roles are reversed.
In the second period, the other participant of the couple, who is the Decider now,
will have to make a decision. The determination of the final assets of the new Receiver
and Decider in this period is similar to the previous period. The Receiver starts with an
endowment of 1 and the Decider starts with an endowment of 9. The Decider decides
again on the part of her or his endowment that will be transferred to the Receiver. This
transfer T determines the final assets of both participants in the second period: EO=1+T
for the Receiver and EB=9-T for the Decider.
As said, your earnings in a round are determined by the product of your final assets
EB in your role of Decider and the final assets EO in your role of Receiver. Your assets
EB are dependent on your transfer to the Receiver in the period you are Decider and
your assets EO are dependent on the transfer from the Decider to you in the period you
are Receiver. To facilitate the determination of your earnings, you may use the table
below.
The table states your earnings in points in a round dependent on the transfer from
you to the Receiver when you are Decider and the transfer to you by the Decider when
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you are Receiver. In this table the rows present the transfer from you as Decider to
the Receiver and the columns present the transfer to you as Receiver from the Decider.
When you first look for the transfer from you in the row and then go to the right to the
column stating the transfer to you, you can read your earnings in points, EB × EO, for
the round. The earnings in money are determined by multiplying the stated amount in
points by 5 cents.
Transfer to you
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 9 18 27 36 45 54 63 72
1 8 16 24 32 40 48 56 64
2 7 14 21 28 35 42 49 56
Transfer 3 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48
from you 4 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
5 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32
6 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
7 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
When the two period in a round are over, so when both participants have decided on
a transfer, a new round will be started.
Procedure and usage of the computer
After we have gone through the instructions, first a practice round will be run. After the
practice round, the fifteen rounds that determine your earnings for this experiment will
be run.
In every round the computer, in a completely random manner, first determines who
will be matched to whom. Then the computer determines, again in a random manner,
for each couple who will get the role of Receiver and Decider in the first period. On the
upper left part of the screen the Decider will see the number of the current round and
the message ” You are now Decider in the first period”. Underneath the Decider will
seethe question ”How much of your endowment do you transfer (0-7)?” The Decider has
to type an integer from 0 up to and including 7. The number typed is the transfer T to
the Receiver with whom he has been matched in this round.
Next, the current Decider will be asked the question ”How much do you expect to
receive?”. Here, the Decider types an integer from 0 up to and including 7, dependent on
her or his expectation about the transfer she or he expects to receive as Receiver in the
next period. This expectation is used by us when analyzing the experiment, but your
earnings will be unaffected by it. Besides, the other participants are not informed about
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your expectations stated.
After all Deciders have made a decision, the first period is over. In the second period
the Receivers of the first period are now the Deciders. Every new Decider will see on the
screen that in this round he or she is Decider in the second period [and how much he or
she has received in the previous period]. Underneath there is the question ”How much
of your endowment do you transfer (0-7)?. The Decider has to type an integer from 0
up to and including 7. The number typed is the transfer T to the Receiver with whom
he has been matched in this round. When all Deciders of the second period have made
a decision all participants will see how much they have received and what their earnings
for the rounds are. These earnings are in points and are equal to the product of the
final assets as Decider and the final assets as Receiver: EB × EO. After one has been
informed about this, the round is over and a new round will be started.
In the new round, the computer again determines first who will be matched with
whom and next for each couple who will be the first Decider. So, you do not know with
whom you are matched in a particular round and whether you will be the first or the
second Decider.
Summary
The experiment consists of 15 rounds, and every round consists of 2 periods. In each
round the participants are randomly matched two by two by the computer. In each round
every participant has in one period the role of Decider and in the other period the role
of Receiver. When you are Decider your endowment is 9 and your final assets depend
on your transfer T to the Receiver: EB=9-T. When you are Receiver your endowment
is 1 and your final assets depend on the transfer T by the Decider to you: EO=1+T.
Your earnings in points in a round are determined by the product of your final assets as
Decider and your final assets as Receiver: EB × EO. [After the first period of a round is
over the new Deciders are informed about the transfer T which they have received in the
first period.] After both periods in a round have been finished, everybody is informed
about the transfer T to him or her and his or her earnings in that round.
The matching of the participants and the order in which participants are Decider
in the two periods of a round are determined by the computer in a completely random
way time after time. You will never be able to know whether you will be the first or
the second Decider in a particular round, or with whom you are matched in a particular
round.
Final remarks
After the last round, you will first be requested to answer some questions to evaluate the
experiment. This questionnaire is anonymous. We can link your answers to your seat
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number but not to your name. After that, you will be called by your seat number to
receive your earnings privately and confidentially. Your earnings are your own business;
you do not need to discuss with anyone. It is not allowed to talk to or communicate with
other participants during the experiment in either way.
On your table you will find an empty sheet, which you can use to take notes. Addi-
tionally, you will find a sheet labeled ”REMARKS”. On this sheet you can make remarks
about the instructions or your decisions.
You get a couple of minutes to go through the instructions and to ask questions.
When you want to ask something, please raise your hand. One of us will come to your
table to speak to you.
After that we will start the practice round.
Are there any questions?
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Figure 1: Average gifts t1 and t2 by round in the Netherlands
Figure 2: Average gifts t1 and t2 by round in Norway
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